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abstract
This paper explores the multidimensional effects of an external non-tariff measure (NTM) 
on maritime transportation between the United States (US) and Puerto Rico (PR) trades. 
In particular, this research addresses the vulnerability level of PR’s agrifood sector in rela-
tion to sustainability as a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) highly influenced by a larger 
economy. Due to the high potential of climate changes in the Caribbean, this study reviewed 
the effects of a maritime cabotage policy on a SIDS agribusinesses’ logistic. Could a NTM 
affect the supply chain capabilities and the food security of a SIDS? What challenges and op-
portunities does the US Cabotage policy present for PR’s agricultural sector’s competitive-
ness? Based on mixing empirical analysis in an exploratory convergent design, the research 
categorizes the cabotage policy in relation to the effects on PR’s agrifood supply chain, its 
port infrastructure, and its native agribusinesses’ competitiveness. Results show the mari-
time cabotage itself is a constraint. However, the interactions with others NTMs, indirectly 
related to the cabotage but inherent to the political status and business relationship between 
PR and the US, add other limits. In addition, it revealed that internal factors have an impact 
on the efficiency and competitiveness of PR’s agro-industrial sector. [Keywords: Food secu-
rity; Small Island Developing State; Agrifood Supply Chain; Non-Tariff Measure; Agribusi-
nesses Logistic; Maritime Cabotage; Supply Chain Capabilities; Vulnerability]
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1. Introduction
Puerto Rico has many strengths that include its political stability, literacy rates, dol-
larized economy, access to US markets, and absence of direct U.S. taxes (Collins et 
al. 2006). Ironically, Puerto Rico’s particular political relationship with the U.S. is 
questioned due to its highly unequal society (IEPR 2018), higher than average price 
of goods (Marazzi-Santiago 2018), and an economic recession and staggering debt 
(Caraballo-Cueto and Lara 2018). To exacerbate the situation, recently, two consecu-
tive hurricanes broke down Puerto Rico’s national supply chain (Holpuch 2017).1 
These disasters helped reveal how some of the US Federal Government regulations 
could be affecting Puerto Rico’s agrifood production and sustainable development. 
It is not possible to understand the humanitarian crisis that ensued on Septem-
ber 2017 without considering the long-standing political and economic phenomena 
that preceded it. An exploration of Puerto Rico’s Maritime Merchant Law, and its 
agricultural sector before Hurricane Maria are needed to situate multidimensional 
findings of this research. The findings could be meaningful to policymakers, other 
SIDS, and U.S. off-shore jurisdictions.
This paper does not assume a stance against the relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the US. This research approaches the phenomenon of the US Cabotage Act 
as a commercial relationship using an operational perspective focused on sustainable 
development and food insecurity.
1.1. The Jones Act 1920 as a non-tariff measure (NTM)
Since 1917, the relationship between Puerto Rico and the US has been linked with a 
“Jones Act” (Venator-Santiago 2017). Between 1917 and the mid-1930s the name “Jones 
Act” was popularly applied to various2 US federal laws. Although different in intent (e.g., 
citizenship, cabotage), the term causes some confusion to this day (Rivera 2007; Dietz 
1989). This paper is focused on the operational effects of the Wesley “Jones Act” or the 
Merchant Maritime Act. The Act was strategically designed as a reformulation3 of the 
US maritime trade policies but legislated in 1920 as a framework for the US Cabotage 
structure between the US and its territories. With World War I as a context, the initia-
tive was also supported by the US security/military apparatus to re-ordain and register 
all the US flagged carriers (Pantojas-García 1990). These trade restrictions, based on the 
Dutch and British imperial rules, have been building up through decades of administra-
tive structures to benefit the US maritime industry (Santos 1997), whilst diluting its cost 
in terms of the total welfare among its mammoth economy and its more than 300 mil-
lion consumers (USITC 1991). US cabotage policies are a complex combination of regu-
lations to protect trade among its coasts, which in the long run has shrunk its national 
registered fleet (USGAO 1998). Currently in Puerto Rico, unlike other non-incorporated 
US territories,4 this Act limits trades only to ships constructed and repaired in the US, 
operated by US citizens, and registered under the US flag (Torruellas 2017). 
In some cases, policies designed for developed markets are not necessarily suit-
able for the less developed ones and/or small economy realities (Stiglitz 2010). That 
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is the case because some policy instruments (such as NTM) could affect competi-
tiveness creating hidden costs to trade and/or business behaviors, that by their par-
ticularity, may imply indirect effects on the agents (participants) (May 2015; Beghin 
2013). Literature on this subject is scarce and limited when it comes to proposing 
methods to analyze multidimensional effects of a NTM on SIDS. 
The US maritime cabotage could fit the above description. Unfortunately, the 
regulation has primarily been studied based on its welfare cost5 (AMP 2018; Alameda 
and Valentín 2014; Cruz et al. 2014; Martínez 2014; Estudios Técnicos 2013; Lewis 
2013; USGAO 2013). Another area which has received some attention is the market-
political relations (Clar 2013; Collazo 2012; Frankel 2002; Santos 1997). Very little is 
said about agribusinesses or the regulation’s interaction with the business environ-
ment in which chain actors operate.
Depending on location, transport costs on import values vary between 8 percent 
and 13 percent (Márquez-Ramos et al. 2007). Every time one maritime line buys an-
other, two carriers merge or a group forms an alliance; the ports, terminals, and/or 
clients are affected in one way or another. In the next years, more consolidations are 
expected (Hopman and Nienhuis 2009). These maritime service patterns will have 
greater effects on the most dependent smaller markets, their connectivity, quality of 
services, local business environment, and well-being (Alameda and Valentín 2015; 
Chen et al. 2013). Since the agricultural sector nowadays accounts for less than 1 per-
cent of PR’s GDP and its capacity to export food is practically non-existent, promot-
ing efficiencies in the agricultural sector has not been a priority. As a result, the lit-
erature is silent regarding Puerto Rico’s agribusiness supply chain competitiveness.
On the positive side, Puerto Rico’s agriculture has some characteristics  
of a competitive market.
1.2. Puerto Rico’s agribusinesses sector in context
Puerto Rico’s agricultural sector has lacked attention since the mid-1970s (Comas 
2009). The disregard for local agriculture is evident when its economic contribution 
is considered. According to the Puerto Rico Planning Board (PRPB) (2015), PR’s ag-
riculture contributes 0.85 percent of the GDP or between $700 and 900 million per 
year, of which 55 percent is from animal production. In comparison to similar small 
economies—such as Singapore (0.09 percent), Hong Kong (0.1 percent), Bahrain (0.3 
percent) and Ireland (1.6 percent)—the percentage of Puerto Rico’s agricultural contri-
bution seems to be relatively high. Overall, however, considering other factors from the 
World Economic Forum (2013), such as restrictions to trade, inequality levels (GINIc) 
and the cost of agricultural policies to access food, PR shows a lower performance. 
Geographically speaking, Puerto Rico is no different from other SIDS in the re-
gion. Like them, PR is totally dependent on maritime transportation and shows a 
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large imbalance in agricultural goods trade (FAO 2006). According to Setrini (2012), 
Puerto Rico’s producers are squeezed between the low cost of industrial producers 
in the US and low-wage producers in the Caribbean and Latin American countries. 
On the positive side, Puerto Rico’s agriculture has some characteristics of a competi-
tive market. First, its market openness is as high as the rivalry between international 
and domestic (US Interstate Commerce Act) products and native producers (WEF 
2013). Second, the local infrastructure permits native distributors to make ‘just-in-
time’ purchases, thus giving fresh products more days on the shelf (Setrini 2012). 
Third, the number of producers6 and buyers is relatively large. For instance, in 2012 
the Puerto Rican food consumption expenditures were estimated to be $8.93 billion, 
making up 14.64 percent of the total consumption expenditures ($2,400 per capita/
year) in food (González and Gregory 2014). 
Regarding imports, according to the PRPB (2015) using data of 2012, the value 
of the food and agricultural goods imported to Puerto Rico represents around 4 per-
cent of all of Puerto Rico’s importations. Interestingly, approximately 95 percent of 
the agriculture (livestock and food) goods imported to Puerto Rico is produced by 
15 countries, but the vast majority (84 percent) comes from North American Free 
Trade Agreement members; namely the US, Canada, and Mexico. The highest per-
centage (79 percent), nonetheless, comes as domestic trade from the US estimated to 
be worth $3 billion (USD).
Puerto Rico’s agribusiness sector is highly susceptible to external shocks. These 
outside variables include other restricting factors from their trade with the US, such 
as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. In addition, Puerto Rico’s agribusiness 
is highly exposed to natural conditions (e.g., hurricanes, overflows) and a low level of 
added value in native production. These factors, according to González and Gregory 
(2014), have been detrimental to Puerto Rico’s production over the last twenty years, 
particularly for crops—vegetables and root produce.
1.2.1. Grains and animal produce sectors
The strongest agricultural sector in PR, and the most dependent on grain imports, 
is animal production. It is well known within the agricultural community that ani-
mal feed constitutes between 50 percent and 70 percent of production costs in this 
sector. In Puerto Rico, 100 percent of grains for feedstuff are imported making its 
strongest agricultural sector entirely dependent on maritime transportation. In the 
last decade, the number of grain-importing companies in Puerto Rico has dwindled 
(Departamento de Agricultura 2012). It seems that their disappearance has been af-
fected by factors such as bankruptcy or consolidations, the grains’ volatile costs, and 
the impact of trading costs. 
The grain-importing sector is broken down into animal feed manufacturing and 
flour milling and baking. Puerto Rico’s animal feed industry, as a production system, 
consists of four basic activities: grain buyers’ resale, grain transformation, product 
trading with wholesalers and retailers, and secondary product sales to consumers. 
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In general, these are the first basic echelons in the animal production agrifood chain. 
Before the animal feed product is consumed, various processes are undertaken in the 
chain. They include grain producers at the farm level, grain elevators and sellers, trans-
porters, surveyors and receivers, inspectors, regulators and other secondary activities 
associated with them (Morgan 2000). Grains are transported and delivered in dry bulk 
vessels separated by hatch. For each of these processes, some buyers are searching for 
a combination of low prices and high quality. Price is the most traditional decisional 
factor used in this business. Commonly, animal producers are not well informed about 
the technical–nutritional requirements of their animals, but they are highly aware of 
the costs for their own business. Consequently, farmers searching for lower prices for 
animal feed may ignore the importance of quality to the detriment of their animals’ 
yield. Similarly, feed mill agribusinesses are focused on low-cost materials rather than 
improving efficiency through innovation and technology (Chavarría et al. 2002).   
1.2.2. Fresh produce sector
World Bank (2015) data show that like some of the smallest Caribbean nations but unlike 
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, Puerto Rico’s import of its food needs are 
high. Popularly it is estimated at above 80 percent. Around 70 percent of this amount is 
imported from the US markets and almost 92 percent specifically from the Jacksonville 
Florida Port (Comas 2009). The literature is much less informative about which products 
are considered in these percentages and whether Puerto Rico’s production is enough to 
cover its market needs. Puerto Rico’s market dependence on imported food may entail 
several dangers, beginning with the fact that in a national emergency the population 
would not be able to feed itself. Second, food imports depend on volatile export markets 
susceptible to periodic market access disruptions and external regulations. Unlike grain, 
produce imports are transported in refrigerated or controlled climate storage units. 
Third, climate change, with more frequent and severe events (e.g., hurricanes, floods) 
can seriously affect food supply available on the global market.
1.3 Theoretical stance 
The scholarly silences mentioned earlier coupled with the political, regulatory and 
geographical particularities of PR call for an eclectic theoretical stance from which 
to explore Cabotage as a non-tariff measure (NTM) and its effects on the agrifood 
system. Consequently, the worldview guiding this research incorporates tenets from 
the field of development, engineering (i.e., agricultural, mechanical and industrial), 
management and logistics.
As mentioned, NTMs may affect trade and/or its supply chain (Beghin 2013). A 
threat to food security may arise through higher prices—making food unaffordable for 
many—or through food scarcity at any price—as a result of political, economic and me-
chanical issues (Hubbard and Hubbard 2013, 142). Consequently, the sustainable devel-
opment aims (UNSDSN 2014) on the basis of food security became an important topic 
to evaluate SIDS’ economic vulnerability. This research relies on Briguglio’s (2003) 
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factors of integrated supply chain and the level of dependence on strategic imports as 
basis to interpret national economic vulnerability. This research also considers Porter’s 
(1985) proposal on “strategy and structure” importance in developing firms’ competi-
tive advantages but also the “forces” that might affect them. Exploring regulations with 
effects on the national vulnerability and firms’ competitiveness, in this context, may 
support the local economic objectives but, more importantly, the nation’s food security. 
Competitiveness variables associated with market, infrastructure and governmen 
play an important role too via their different interactions withexternal or interna indi-
cators. Their weight is important in competitive analyses at the firm, cluster, regional 
or national level (Porter 1985). At the firm level and arguing that tangible and intan-
gible forms of resources have the potential to sustain or affect competitiveness, Barney 
(1991) developed the VRIO7 framework to evaluate controlled/private assets. In the 
context of this study, a private asset can be a grain mill, which bases its activity in a 
common product around the world, which is considered rare to the people of Puerto 
Rico because it is not produced there. However, it is argued that sectoral, systemic 
and non-economic factors could also be highly influential on the competitiveness and 
therefore basic for the agrifood supply chain analysis (Rojas et al. 2000). 
Latruffe’s (2010) suggestions about the importance of the relationship among 
markets and/or between importers and suppliers, as competitiveness factors, were 
also considered. In addition, Brandon-Jones and colleagues (2014) highlight the 
firms’ supply chain visibility8—particularly during the importation process—and the 
way in which it was considered. In this research, because the NTM under study is 
related to the maritime sector, the author looks upon the ideas of De Martino and 
Morvillo (2008) to identify systemic key factors of port competitiveness that exert an 
impact on the supply chain network. 
To explore the multidimensional effects of the US Cabotage Act as an NTM, this 
research considered cabotage as an external regulation on Puerto Rico as a SIDS. In 
sum, the policies, protocols and decisions related to the Maritime Merchant Act, im-
posed on Puerto Rico, are controlled by the US Federal Government instrumentali-
ties an applied as a “one size fits all” trade framework.   
This study aims to demonstrate how the external policy measures affect the de-
velopment and productivity between agents and domains,9 namely the SIDS’s native 
agribusinesses’ importers’ as agents and their supply chain system, infrastructure, 
and behavior as domains. The discussion centers on the operational dimension of 
the Act on Puerto Rico’s agrifood logistics and its complexities. Puerto Rico’s vul-
nerability and its food security are also presented as the basis on which to study the 
Cabotage phenomenon. 
2. Methodology 
This research incorporated a heterodox economic framework in a convergent mixed 
method design, where the researcher uses concurrent timing to implement the quali-
tative and quantitative strands and prioritizes both data equally (Creswell and Plano 
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2011).10 This research was performed as an ongoing process starting in December 
2014 and finishing in July 2016. Secondary quantitative data (i.e., reports between 
2005 and 2015) of Puerto Rico from the External Trade Statistics and the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture were analyzed to identify the price, origins, and restrictions of 
grains, respectively. Consumption analysis, national production, and farmland avail-
ability for the livestock sector were also assessed as basis of the analysis. The prices 
of grain in the domestic market (from 2010 to 2015) were investigated, from the end 
of the chain to the origin, using international market data as reference point. Ad-
ditionally, the level of openness to trade in grains and the level of consumption and 
remoteness of those goods were considered. The quantitative analysis to evaluate the 
costs on the feedstuff formulations and its cost analyses are based on proportions of 
one macro ingredient11 for dairy cattle, poultry, and hogs. 
In regards to qualitative analysis, semi-structured interviews constituted the in-
strument for the primary data collection for the period between December 2015 and 
February 2015. A snowball sampling technique was used. Overall, import representa-
tives were selected on the basis of the agribusinesses under analysis and the practi-
cal feasibility of accessing the companies. The semi-structured question instrument 
was designed using the variables of Porter’s Diamond. Porter’s framework helped 
identify factors related to the internal agribusiness competitiveness through the di-
mension of an external NTM. The instrument targeted the effect of the Cabotage Act 
(external NTM) on the agribusiness supply chain, the operational activities, the inte-
gration into the chain, business importing logistics, and secondary activities related 
to operational processes. Independent variables associated with maritime transpor-
tation, such as the role of government and non-governmental organizations, port 
mooring costs, handling fees, insurance and inspections were studied. Using NVivo, 
the data were coded for three dimensions: external, internal, and cultural factors. 
These dimensions were anchored in vulnerability to trade, the managers’ perception 
of business competitiveness, the level of supply chain complexities, and the strate-
gies implemented to deal with maritime transportation costs. 
The primary data collection (i.e., interviews) was done in Spanish and conduct-
ed in Puerto Rico. The goal was to learn more about interviewees’ perceptions, logis-
tics, and strategies for dealing with the cabotage challenges in their business’s supply 
chain. Categorical coding was applied to sort the findings into formulated concepts 
and areas of decisions (internal or external to the firm). Once the thematic networks 
had been created, the data were integrated and interpreted.
The sample was representative of the vast majority of the companies recognized 
in PR as native importing agribusinesses for the period between 2000 and 2015. The 
group consisted of seven fresh-produce importer companies in a market estimated 
at $230 million per year; three of them accounted for more than 75 percent of the 
produce sales. The second group was associated with the importing of grain, raw ma-
terial, and other goods used in the animal feed sector with gross sales of about $200 
million per annum. In this group of nine importing firms, all existing operational 
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firms of animal feedstuff were interviewed, as well as representatives from two firms 
no longer in the market. The sector of fertilizers, in which the overall sales may reach 
over $40 million per annum, was not analyzed in this research. However, some of the 
participants were related to that agribusiness. Only some of the interview partici-
pants were predetermined in the initial selection, and the rest were chosen based on 
the development of the research. 
3. Discussion and empirical analysis 
This section summarizes the data analysis and findings regarding the agrifood trade 
relationship between US and Puerto Rico and directly and/or indirectly related with 
the Cabotage phenomena. Informative topics gathered through the fieldwork and 
some multidimensional effects of Cabotage are segmented in the following six sub-
sections. Each one describes the scenario pre 2017 hurricanes considering hard-in-
frastructure, cross regulations, soft-infrastructure, agribusinesses firms (i.e., grain, 
fruit and vegetables), and emerging issues. 
3.1. PR’s port infrastructure
Puerto Rico has eleven official ports12 registered under the Puerto Rico Ports Author-
ity (PRPA) (USDoC 2015). Most of the maritime facilities are in the port of San Juan 
(North). Although the Ponce (South) and Mayagüez (West) ports fall under PRPA’s 
jurisdiction, the ports were administratively delegated to public-private partner-
ships and municipalized, respectively.
For more than a decade, PRPA, which is governed by a board of directors headed 
by an executive director, has acted more like a real-estate corporation than a port-
planning manager. By law (No. 125 of May 1942, as amended), the PRPA was created 
to own and manage all the sea and air facilities for cargo and passenger cruises in the 
Puerto Rican archipelago (OMB 2011).13 Various agencies of the US Federal Govern-
ment are related to PRPA, such as the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US 
Army Corp of Engineers and particularly the US Coast Guard. As a result, the PRPA’s 
planning programs and some decisions are in a direct relationship with these agen-
cies. According to some of the participants, some grants and technical assistance are 
provided annually by these and other US Federal Government agencies. PRPA invest-
ments are commonly focused on the airport infrastructure rather than the maritime 
port. However, PRPA is facing serious financial problems.
The interviewees agreed that private companies and not the PRPA provide most 
shipping industry services, including tugs, pilotage, fuel delivery, water supply, pro-
visions, customs, water supply, and vessel maintenance. Since the Navieras de Puerto 
Rico was sold in 1995 due to questionable considerable losses (estimated at $350 
million), the Government of Puerto Rico does not have a cargo fleet (Frankel 2002). 
Various interviewees support the idea that the whole operational transportation sys-
tem is privatized but outdated and inefficient, with effects on Puerto Rico’s market 
particularly on the native businesses.
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San Juan’s port is the only port in the north of the main island that is naturally pro-
tected from the strength of the Atlantic Sea. While San Juan is Puerto Rico’s main 
port with 26 piers or dockyards, Ponce’s (in the south) has the deepest draught (15 
m in 3 dockyards and a road) and is the most recently redesigned. The cargo port of 
San Juan has a relatively tight entrance, and exiting might require a harbor pilot. Ac-
cording to the interviewed PRPA officials, the port offers a total of 4.6 hectares (ha) 
of space for loading/unloading cargo. All facilities are rented to private companies. 
In this port area the relationship is mixed. For instance, one of the three agribusiness 
grain importers has its own dockyard. Regarding the docking places of the other two 
grain firms, although the PRPA is the landlord, these are lent to them by long-term 
contracts. It is estimated that PR may have more than 30 private cargo dockyards, 
none of which pay fees to the PRPA and the majority of which are linked to an indus-
trial business, but data to validate this claim were not available. 
It is estimated that PR may have more than 30 private cargo dockyards, none of which 
pay fees to the PRPA and the majority of which are linked to an industrial business, but 
data to validate this claim were not available.
Due to the limitations in public investment funds, the PRPA’s investment plan 
is currently based on a kind of public-private partnership promoting the terminals’ 
modernization by its current operators. The interviewees report that the PRPA is 
using some formulas and fixing rent fees in the long term that are contingent to the 
investment. However, the draughts represent a limitation.
On the west coast, Guánica and Mayagüez specifically, some raw materials for 
agribusinesses and pharmaceuticals are received (USDoC 2015). However, in both 
municipalities the cargo dockyards used for agribusiness importers are private, 
which means they are totally administered by their owners. Fieldwork revealed that 
Guánica’s bay is operationally limited by its natural draught (9 m at the entrance and 
6.5 m at the dockyards). In the past, two agribusiness importers (i.e, Pro-Granos and 
Ochoa Fertilizer) had operations there. In Mayagüez, since Star Kits tuna shut down 
its factory, the regional port has had a comparatively insignificant operation. Cur-
rently, its activity is basically nil. Although this region is historically less affected by 
destructive hurricanes (Mujica-Baker n.d), its lack of critical-mass (population) af-
fects its business potential. 
The US authority on ports is spread throughout all three levels of government—
federal, stateW and local—but its Constitution grants the federal government exclusive 
jurisdiction over domestic waterways (Sherman 2002). Since Puerto Rico’s bays are 
federalized, many activities are subject to control by the US Federal Government and a 
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plethora of overlapping regulations. For example, investments must be authorized by 
the US Army Corps of Engineers and various other federal agencies. Before hurricane 
Maria, Puerto Rico’s main lane in the port of San Juan was limited to 12.2 m (40’) in 
depth.14 Authorization of maintenance extraction procedures in the bay is relatively 
easy to undertake, but according to some of the interviewees authorization could take 
almost a year and for major dredging extractions is very unlikely—if not impossible—to 
obtain. Additionally, the cost of extraction procedures would imply a huge expense for 
Puerto Rico. The cost of renovating every pier and dockyard in the port should also be 
included because many of them were designed in the 1940s under different conditions 
and requirements. Lower draught limits sea trade mostly to modern and efficient ves-
sels. To offer a comparison, the South America’s main ports show—an overall draught 
average—1.3 m (4.2’) deeper than Puerto Rico’s main port. Wilmsmeier and Sánchez 
(2015) report that between 2012 and 2014 the average draught on the east coast (ECSA) 
of that region is 13.3 m (43.6’) and the maximum draught 14.5 m (47.6’).  
Another weakness of Puerto Rico’s port system is its infrastructure, which is basi-
cally owned by domestic (US) firms; thus, foreign direct investment in the maritime 
infrastructure is practically non-existent (Estudios Tecnicos 2013). According to some 
of the interviewees, the lack of services to repair vessels is another disadvantage. So far, 
the majority of the tugboats, barges, ferries, ships, and other commercial and public 
vessels are repaired abroad. The Dominican Republic and a few small islands in the Ca-
ribbean or the south of the US are the most common places, but for Jones Act vessels, 
their repairs are limited to US territories. Apparently, for decades, PR’s market has had 
no interest in providing this kind of service. Burns (2015) sustains that generally ves-
sel maintenance programs are a lucrative business in high trade markets because they 
have ramifications for logistics and reduce the number calling for services.
Finally, the lack of stability in the PRPA’s direction is an internal (Puerto Rico) 
issue that was presented as one of the causes for the loss of regional competitiveness. 
Between 2008 and 2017, the PRPA had seven executive directors. Certainly, the high 
turnover of managers may affect negatively long-term planning actions. However, 
in summary, Puerto Rico’s ports seem affected by overlapping jurisdictional regula-
tions, the lack of a system of proactive improvements, and clear direction focused on 
logistic performance, facilities’ optimization, and a culture of efficiency. 
3.2. Maritime firms, containerization, and cross regulations
Various maritime companies hold their main service in the area, but literature on this 
particular seems limited. Since 2013, whilst the claims15 for cabotage liberalization 
in Puerto Rico have become more popular, some of these firms announced aggressive 
investment plans and terminal modernization programs. Interviewed PRPA officials 
informed that the biggest coastal areas in San Juan are rented to Crowley and Sea 
Star Lines. It is understood that, overall, around 16 maritime (domestic and foreign) 
service providers16 operate in Puerto Rico. However, the vast majority of the infra-
structure and terminal operations are carried out by these two main domestic firms.
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The US maritime firm Crowley has been one of the biggest in the US for more 
than a century. It has served the domestic market of Puerto Rico (approximately 38 
percent)17 for over five decades and has over 200 employees. In the US, it is a huge 
maritime firm providing services from the most basic logistics to naval design and 
building. Its operation in Puerto Rico (in 31 ha) is based on roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) 
vessels, but in 2014 it reported the acquisition of new ships for 2017. Two brand-new 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) ships with capacity for 900 containers will be part of its 
fleet to serve Puerto Rico’s market. Additionally, Crowley will invest approximately 
$45 million in a new maritime cargo terminal (in San Juan), as part of a long-term 
contract lent agreement with the PRPA (Sin Comillas 2015). In 2015, they conducted 
a full renovation and draught of the dockyard and acquired three new cranes for con-
tainers, power stations for refrigerated containers, new generation containers and 
ISO tanks, and equipment to manage containers on the ground. In addition, a new 
logistics yard design for easy trucking access started in 2016. They reported that the 
whole investment is over $400 million (Han 2017). 
According to the interviewees, TOTE Maritime operates the second domestic 
firm: Sea Star Lines. Its Puerto Rico operations, based in Jacksonville, Florida, start-
ed in the 1970s and represent approximately between 25 percent and 32 percent of 
all Puerto Rico’s domestic traffic (as of 2014). Whilst Sea Star has previously concen-
trated on domestic cargoes, they recently acquired the firm Tropical Shipping exclu-
sively dedicated to international trade (TOTE Service 2014). In addition, between 
late 2016 and mid-2017, two new LNG high-tech ships were added to its fleet. So far, 
Sea Star Lines is the only paperless terminal operator company in Puerto Rico. Many 
of its procedures to track, trace, and pick up containers are digitalized or performed 
by a scanning system. As part of its transformation, in 2017, Sea Star announced an 
investment between $10 and $25 million in its terminal to become more modern with 
a full containers tracking system (CTS), chassis, drivers, buyers, and other security 
devices (Sin Comillas 2016). 
While it should be highlighted that the purchasing pronouncement made by 
Crowley and TOTE—each buying two new LNG ships made in the US— a business 
decision, it is also highly influenced by the US Merchant Maritime Act and its over-
lapping regulations. The literature sustains that international shipbuilders are well 
experimented and also significantly cheaper than their US competitors (Donga 2015; 
UNCTAD 2013; Hopman and Nienhuis 2009). 
The third-biggest area of (30 ha) was administered by Horizon, but during this 
research, the firm decided to close operations and the PRPA was selecting a new 
operator. According to the research participants, Horizon was a mixed company at-
tending to approximately 35 percent of the international and 30 percent of the do-
mestic carriers to/from Puerto Rico with particular interest on reefers. 
Another domestic company that operates in Puerto Rico is Trailer Bridge, based 
in Jacksonville, but in comparison with the companies mentioned earlier, it has lim-
ited space, managing around 15 percent of all Puerto Rico’s domestic trade. It is more 
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focused on lift-on/lift-off (LO–LO) and RO–RO vessels but also manages highly di-
versified containers. Although not a contractor of the PRPA, it is in partnership with 
the maritime firm International Shipping, which is a native company dedicated to 
international trade and stevedoring with a PRPA long-term contract. It is an example 
of a partnership between two relatively small maritime service providers, one based 
in Jacksonville and the other based in San Juan, offering global access to Puerto Rico. 
Luis Ayala-Colón SCs, focused on international cargoes, is the fifth maritime firm. It 
is an experimented local-native operator, which although limited in resources pro-
vides stevedoring services to international carriers, as well as some domestic ones. 
To contrast Puerto Rico’s domestic maritime firms, the two US off-shore states, 
Alaska and Hawaii, have only two main operators each: TOTE (Sea Star in Puerto 
Rico) and Matson, and Matson and Pasha, respectively. These are highly specialized 
container management companies. Nevertheless, the new configuration in these 
markets reduced competition and strengthened the players. For instance, Matson 
bought Horizon’s Alaska service and competes with TOTE. In Hawaii, the firm Pa-
sha, which operates RO–RO tonnage in this market, acquired Horizon’s Hawaii oper-
ation to compete with Matson.18 However, unlike the mentioned US off-shore states, 
Puerto Rico’s population, market, and container traffic are higher. 
Although all of these companies are recruiters of local talent, only Horizon and 
Ayala-Colón boards are in the majority local investors. The maritime firm Island 
Stevedoring is a small, local company dedicated to carrying construction materials, 
such as wood and pipes, paper, less than a container’s load (LCL) and cars. Many 
international lines of transport, such as Maersk, Norton Lilly International, Oceanic 
General Agency, Henríquez & Assoc and Pérez & Cia use Puerto Rico’s ports (Noticel 
2015); however, they have service agreements with the maritime service providers 
mentioned above. Therefore, international companies have no similar infrastructure 
or investment in Puerto Rico’s ports. Among other reasons, the majority of imports to 
Puerto Rico are domestic, and the costs of initiation in this business are very high. As 
a result, partnerships with the operators mentioned above seem to be an acceptable 
business model for them.
All the mentioned maritime firms in Puerto Rico are well equipped to manage 
containers efficiently. It is important to clarify that containers’ sizes are measured 
by density thus using equivalent units. For international trades, the sizes were stan-
dardized in 20’ (TEU) and 40’ (FEU), while in domestics the sizes are determined 
by each country (Burns 2015). For instance, in the US, container sizes are 45’, 48’, 
and 53’ long. This offers more options to trade but as the volume becomes higher 
(in equivalent units),  its relative gross cargo weight (gcw) becomes lower because 
its dimensions are not yet designed to handle the same rigors as sea (international) 
containers. Perishable produce such as vegetables and fruits are transported regu-
larly using refrigerated or climatized containers named reefers. Containers over 45’ 
equivalent units are relatively rare for reefers, but this situation may change in the fu-
ture. Nevertheless, interviewed produce importers reported challenges to maritime 
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firms since Horizon’s closing, including:  the availability of vessels suited to trans-
port high number of reefers at once, adequate space equipped for reefers once in the 
yard, and high density for storage. Regarding the first challenge, reefer ships differ 
from general container carriers in their power generation and electrical distribution 
equipment (Burns 2015). Although limited, reefers can be carried in general design 
vessels, but this is a challenge because in addition to the lack of space and good bal-
ance for containers’ stackability, they are generally limited in power connections. The 
reported issues of adequate space and storage might be related to lack of investments 
and issues of flows and terminal designs. Grain traded in domestic journeys is com-
monly transported in dry-bulk vessels or barge carriers due to its capability to travel 
inland (across rivers). The fieldwork shows that in Puerto Rico these cargoes are di-
rectly managed by the importing grain company rather than some of the “port service 
providers” or “terminal operators”
Using data between 1999 and 2009, the Inter American Development Bank 
ranked the technical efficiency of containers at the port of San Juan as first among 
other 62 ports in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America (Morales-
Sarriera et al. 2013) (Fig. 1). Between 2008 and 2016, the port of San Juan was ranked 
(63, 71, 72, 79, 80, 92, 94 to 94, respectively) in the list of top 100 world ports in con-
tainer traffic (AAPA 2017). In 2017, based on container traffic, Lloyds Maritime Intel-
ligence launched its top 100 ports rank (Nightingale 2017). On that list, the lowest 
traffic was 1.4 million TEU. Puerto Rico’s numbers are even lower, thus not included. 
At the domestic level, the US Department of Commerce (2015) classified San Juan as 
13th of the 38 US ports in total volume (MT) transported. In the value of goods im-
Figure 1: Port efficiency in Latin America and the Caribbean; Extracted from: 
Morales-Sarriera et al (2013).
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ported from the US, the port of San Juan is classified 17th of 38 ($11.7 billion in 2012) 
and 19th of 38 in the value of goods exported to the US ($4.4 billion in 2012) (USDoC, 
2015). The majority of goods (food and grains) imported to Puerto Rico are carried 
through San Juan. Clearly, while these rankings show that at least 1.2 million TEU 
are annually managed by the maritime firms in Puerto Rico, a reduction in container 
traffic is evident. However, not much has been said about logistics, efficiency, infra-
structure, dry-bulk activities, and/ or performance variables of Puerto Rico’s port. 
According to Szakonyi (2014), the southbound rates of transport from Jack-
sonville to San Juan are between $2,600 and $3,400 per twenty-foot equivalent unit 
(TEU), with dry-box prices on the lower side and reefers priced higher. Although not 
specifically clear, these TEU rates probably imply a higher cost to trade forty-foot 
equivalent unit (FEU) containers. Furthermore, he affirms that northbound rates on 
the same route are between $500 and $700 per TEU. He suggests that the export cost 
per dry container from PR to Jacksonville is basically non-existent because the ves-
sel’s operational costs and drayage to Florida might be equivalent to the number of 
full containers loaded (FCL). Maritime transportation providers should develop lo-
gistics to guarantee the full return of containers and worst-case scenario with no less 
than 25 percent FCL; otherwise, operational costs would become more expensive or 
unsustainable (Burns 2015).
Currently, the costs on Puerto Rico northbound domestic routes are lower than 
that percentage19 (Szakonyi 2014). Although recognizing that Puerto Rico’s market is 
far more crowded than that of Alaska and Hawaii, there has been a reduction (around 
12 percent) in the total of containers at domestic imports to Puerto Rico, which could 
be associated with Puerto Rico’s economic depression (Fig. 2). However, a pattern of 
reduction in the number of containers from Puerto Rico to the US was previewed by 
Frankel (2002) almost two decades ago. 
At the International Convention of Safe Containers in 1972 a resolution for the 
safety traffic of containers was adopted. It promoted among members some human 
life safety measures during container management, such as maximum gross weight 
or ratings, handling, stacking, and whether under a single bill of lading or under sepa-
rate bills of lading (IMO 2014). In the US, since 1997 containers have faced some 
management restrictions by the Intermodal Safe Container Act (Public Lax 102-548, 
Oct. 1992). This act regulates the loaded container from its place of origin to its place 
of destination in multimodal transportation. The gross cargo weight (gcw) is also 
regulated according to the container size. Currently, at the international level, this 
kind of regulation is common in developed and in some less developed countries. 
However, this research revealed that the gcw limits in the US are lower (40’ max gcw 
20 MT) than in Mexico (40’ max gcw 21 MT), Canada (40’ max gcw 21.8 MT), or the 
UK (40’ max gcw 26 MT) and Japan (40’ max gcw 30 MT). Furthermore, the gcw 
is even less strict for shipping containers from less developed countries such as the 
Dominican Republic (40’max gcw 31 MT). This limit on gcw could have an impact 
in PR’s container traffic but also on space optimization, efficiency, and cost analysis. 
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Unlike domestic ships, foreign vessels and/or containers require authorization from 
US agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Custom Border Patrol, the Department of Agri-
culture (APHIS & PPQ), and in some cases the Health Department. The Government 
of Puerto Rico has very limited or no jurisdiction over this matter. As a result, the inter-
vention of a registered “custom broker” is required. Around 22 brokers are recognized 
and authorized by the US federal agencies to provide services in Puerto Rico (Anaya-
Oviedo 2012). On the contrary, the protocols in Puerto Rico for domestic (US) cargoes 
are relatively fast or unnecessary because they are considered to have been inspected or 
to be from a safe place. The interviewees reported that once these containers have been 
unloaded, the importers may receive the cargo in as little as two hours. However, for in-
ternational cargoes these processes may take between 24 and 48 labor hours after the 
docking. The Puerto Rico ratio of container volume per year (domestic: international) 
could be estimated as a ration of  70:30; hence, it is a predominantly domestic market. To 
contrast this average time with other SIDSs’ processes, Puerto Rico’s protocols seem to 
take longer than those of the Mauritius Islands, which according to official data average 
between 30 and 60 minutes (World Bank 2015). For perishables, freshness is related to 
quality, and thus longer container times mean the product’s shelf life is affected and the 
time for consumers’ use is lessened. Therefore, consumers pay for a short-life product.
Data about the domestic maritime transportation rates are limited, and for this 
research it was generated through interviews (Table 1). It should be mentioned that 
the majority of the participating firms were reluctant to share their official annual 
contracts showing the fixed prices rate for containers. Nevertheless, the differences 
in price are noticeable among importing companies (Co), more specifically in trades 
from Jacksonville. Higher freight rates have an impact on all aspects of the economy, 
all the way down to the consumers themselves.
Figure 1: Percentage of change in the US container trade with PR (2008—2013); 
Extracted from: Szakonyi (2014).
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3.3. Digitization, environment, route optimization & cost of energy
Digitization in this field stands for a highly technological system to identify, track, 
and trace containers during the stevedoring process. It includes assigning chassis, 
tracking and measuring the whole process until the container is exported from its or-
igin to its arrival. In Puerto Rico, such technology system is in early stage, not widely 
used, or inexistent.20 Although the process is quite dynamic digitalization of Puerto 
Rico is limited in comparison with other SIDSs markets, such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Unlike airports, it seems that seaports have the disadvantage of a relatively 
low traffic of people and thus fewer funds to improve areas, logistics, and efficiency 
in processes. Seaports lack priority unless a union declares a lockout and/or during a 
climatic phenomenon or a humanitarian crisis.
Environmentally, sea ports’ locations are highly vulnerable to climate effects such 
as rising sea levels, intensive hurricanes, among others. These events can cause heavy 
flooding at ports and operation disruptions. For example, in 2000 Hurricane George 
caused serious damage and destruction to practically all the basic port facilities and 
terminals, blocking the main entrance of the port of San Juan, devastating Puerto Ri-
Note: 12th of December - 10th of February. ‡Inland to Jacksonville.  †Port was not mentioned
** 45 foot NOT refrigerated container from Haina Port. The rate varies by volume; the first is 7 
containers vs. 1 container, respectively. 
*** The price for 45-foot containers is $300 higher.
Table 1: Price per FEU refrigerated containers and distance (n.m.) from the port 
of origin to the port of San Juan, PR. 
Value in USD
Origin
Distance 
(n.m.)
Days Co 9 co 10 Co 11 Other
Jacksonville, US 1333 4 5,350 4,500 4,000 6,300***
California, US‡ * 9 N/P 9,000 10,500 -
Miami, US 1057 3.5 N/P N/P N/P 6,688
Philadelphia, US * 8    -
Sto. Domino, DR 300 0.7 2,200 2,300 2,250
1,057-
1,240*
Pto. Limón, CR 1342 2.5
2,800-
3,300
N/P 2,500 -
Nicaragua† 1500 3.5-5.5
2,400- 
3,300
N/P 2,500 -
Columbia† - - 3,450 - - -
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co’s economy for months. Fortunately, during hurricanes Irma and Maria the damages 
to infrastructure on Puerto Rico’s main ports were not as serious as they were in the 
2000. However, many of the commercial port terminals in Puerto Rico are outdated. 
This is particularly obvious in the private terminals of the grain-importing firms. For 
instance, the majority of dockyards and commercial terminals in the ports of San Juan 
and Mayagüez are very close to the sea level. Therefore, ordinary operations would be 
affected if the level rises by more than a meter. Since most port activities in Puerto Rico 
are privatized, the PRPA is not directly responsible for implementing environmental 
initiatives associated with clean air programs and emission controls imposed by some 
other local and federal agencies. Hence, little effort has been made to adapt Puerto 
Rico’s cargo ports and their infrastructure to the impacts of climate change. 
Transporting dry-bulk materials requires different supply chain management 
from transporting containers. An increase in annual rainfall or precipitation rates may 
affect its logistics. For example, grains delivered in dry bulk vessels are unloaded under 
an open sky; thus, an increase in the frequency of heavy rain periods would bring delays 
in the process and demurrage fees.21 With regards to fresh produce containers, their 
refrigeration needs, such as electrical devices, entail risks of storm-water effects. 
On the other hand, Ponce’s port is spacious and ready for containers and investments.
During this research, I was informed that the Government of Puerto Rico 
does not have an executive plan or maritime analyst to promote the optimization 
of commercial sea routes as is happening for airlines and cruise lines. Through 
a cross-analysis of commercial sea routes, more possibilities to trade with other 
Latin American countries could be identified, helping in planning and profitabil-
ity. On the subject of space optimization, the ports of San Juan and Mayagüez are 
substantially limited in growth and storage areas. Areas for storing containers are 
practically non-existent in Mayagüez. San Juan is a highly populated port city 
where urban growth takes priority and has a great influence on the limited space 
available. This space issue will represent more challenges to adapt the facilities to 
the local contexts, and it will probably affect the insurance cost rates. On the other 
hand, Ponce’s port is spacious and ready for containers and investments. Although 
it was designed for a trans-shipment operation, it has been underdeveloped since 
its inauguration, arguably, due to its lack of critical-mass.  
Companies hold additional inventories to respond to delivery delays and product 
unreliability. This practice may increase costs for inventory, storage space, energy, and 
so forth. In the case of produce importers, due to its perishability, the inventory levels 
are low, but its climatized storages demand high energy consumption. In regards to the 
grain importers, an efficient goods unloading and its transformation requires highly 
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energy dependent colossal machinery. As a result, on these two sectors the price of 
energy is an important internal variable for competitiveness (Fig. 3). However, Puerto 
Rico’s energy system is poorly maintained and highly dependent on petroleum. Thus it 
is substantially influenced by the oil price, which is an external variable with impact on 
the cost of all its derivatives (transportation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc).  
3.4. Grain importers
Puerto Rico’s animal feed mill sector currently consists of eight firms, but three of them 
were recently consolidated. Altogether, they represent around $250 million in sales per 
year. Their domestic and foreign imports could be estimated to be approximately $130 
million and $35 million, respectively, per year.22 None of Puerto Rico’s grain firms have 
a logistics division or internal personnel dedicated to or specialized in optimizing the 
freight cost. In all of them, the grain-importing process is led and authorized by the 
manager or CEO. Two firms are not factually grain importers but raw material import-
ers for animal feed production. In this research, these two importers are considered 
to be ‘complementary companies.’ One of them imports liquids; and the other, vita-
mins and minerals. Both are vital echelons in the elaboration process of the feedstuff. 
Certainly, these two firms are not directly affected by the volatile international cost of 
grain, but they are importers affected by the cost of maritime transport. 
Grain imports in Puerto Rico are carried in barges and charter ships, all of them 
directly contracted by the grain importers. All firms have external (outside Puerto 
Rico) agreements with grain exporters and/or business advisory services based in 
the US. Sea transportation is supplied by external providers because none has vessels 
as part of its inventory. One has a long-term agreement with a domestic maritime 
firm providing a barge used twice or more per month. 
Figure 3: Cost of energy (kW/h) in US jurisdictions (2012); Extracted from: US 
Energy Information Administration (2015)
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Grain is considered to be a storable commodity that is produced every year. Its 
prices are forecasted and set on future prices affected by many variables; thus, its 
purchase and delivery may represent challenges. For instance, in addition to the cost 
of grain, the barge sets its rates for this journey, which may change weekly. The rates 
could vary by the grain’s city of origin, the carrier’s number of stops, fuel, volume, 
weather conditions, storage costs, local conditions, supply and demand, and other 
factors. These factors are named the ‘basis,’ because they are the difference between 
the current local cash price and the future price of the contract with the closest de-
livery month (Hofstrand 2009). 
Puerot Rico’s tropical weather affects grain storage. Regularly, it is limited to a 
period of three to four months once received. Nevertheless, the firms are technically 
working below their storage capacity level. Except for one firm, the lack of a dock-
yard infrastructure and draught may limit PR’s grain importers’ firms to vessels no 
more than 7 meters in depth. In this case, docking dry bulk cargo ships with 25,000 
tons or more (7.50 m) will be problematic in grain importers facilities. This is not a 
problem for the river barges frequently used by the grain producers in the US, but 
commonly limited in capacity (between 12,000 and 18,000 tons).
Due to the limits of Puerto Rico’s animal feed market, grain importers share ves-
sels and commodities to reduce their cost of transportation or to take advantage of 
bigger volumes in the commodity for a better price. Although negotiations and ac-
cords between the local grain importers seem not to be complex, the logistics and 
shipping coordination require precision and operational agreements.
The grain-importing firms have a direct relationship with equipment, ships and 
their crew, and many other processes related to their goods. In this research, none of 
the interviewees identified negative experiences with the crew of a foreign maritime 
provider. On the contrary, the majority of the participants highlighted their profes-
sionalism, particularly that of the ship leaders. Regarding ship maintenance, various 
participants said the foreign ships that generally arrive in PR show a level of main-
tenance and sophistication that is higher than that of the domestic fleet. The condi-
tions of the domestic fleet were seriously criticized by many of the interviewees. 
My experience with foreign crews is that they are very skilled, they are people with ... 
Just as an example, in the last foreign ship arrival that I had the captain was a veteran, an 
ex-commander of a Russian nuclear submarine. What if both vessels would require the 
most highly trained personnel? We were talking frankly for a while.
The cost of the domestic product versus the foreign one should not include other 
expenses associated with shipping. Although it could be logical to think the value of 
the commodity would not take the transportation cost into consideration, two of the 
participants categorically affirmed that, on the contrary, this is the case for foreign im-
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Table 2: Over-cost of transportation ($8.00) per maize (MT) for Puerto Rico’s 
farmers by sector 
Farms
Year
% Domestic 
origin/yr
Cost per 
unit/yr
Fixed No. 
units 2012
Total cost for 
the sector
100-199 
units
200-299 
units
300-350 
units
2010 72% $15.12 90,000 $1,360,800.00$2,260.44$3,764.88 $4,914.00
2011 57% $11.97 90,000 $1,077,300.00 $1,789.52 $2,980.53$3,890.25
2012 48% $10.08 90,000 $907,200.00 $1,506.96 $2,509.92$3,276.00
2013 36% $7.56 90,000 $680,400.00 $1,130.22 $1,882.44 $2,457.00
2014 75% $15.75 90,000 $1,417,500.00 $2,354.68 $3,921.75 $5,118,75
Year
% Domestic 
origin/yr
Units per 
farm/C
Cost per 
farm/yr
Total cost for 
the sector
2010 72% 30,000 $2,801.87 $196,141.14
2011 57% 30,000 $2,218,15 $155,270.49
2012 48% 30,000 $1,867.92 $130,754.09
2013 36% 30,000 $1,400.94 $98,065.57
2014 75% 30,000 $3,648.27 $255,379.09
Farms
Year %  
Domestic 
origin/yr
Cost 
per 
unit/yr
Fixed 
 No. units 
2012
Total cost  
for the  
sector
100-199 
units
200-299 
units
300-399 
units
400-499 
units
2010 72% $0.77 55,000 $42,588.00 $255.53 $425.88 $596.23 $766.58
2011 57% $0.61 55,000 $33,715.50 $202.29 $337.16 $472.02 $606.88
2012 48% $0.52 55,000 $28,392.00 $170.35 $283.92 $397.49 $511.06
2013 36% $0.39 55,000 $21,294.00 $127.76 $212.04 $298.12 $383.29
2014 75% $0.81 55,000 $44,362.50 $266.18 $443.63 $621.08 $798.53
A. Dairy Farms
B. Poultry Farms
C. Hog Farms
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ports. They posited that the price per MT reported by the foreign exporters includes 
all transportation services until delivery, and that is not the case for domestic suppliers. 
Following their experience, they estimated that overall, although varying monthly, the 
domestic transportation cost is between $8 and $30 per MT higher than the foreign 
cost. In the low-cost scenario, their decision to import is based more on quality than 
on price. However, the quantitative data to support their argument were not provided.
The suggested over-cost was considered to estimate the effects on the cost by 
unit of production. Variables such as the average volume of feedstuff consumed by 
the three main animal production sectors of PR (dairy cow [9 Kg/day per unit]; poul-
try farms [8.5 MT/day per flock]; swine farms [1.2Kg/day per unit]), the proportion of 
maize (65-70 percent) in a basic formulation in PR, and the percentage of domestic 
imports of maize per year were considered (Table 2). 
These analyses only considered the over-cost of maize as a heavy grain. Soy 
meal, corn gluten, fishmeal, and wheat-meal are also common ingredients used in 
feedstuff formulations in Puerto Rico, and many of them are imported. However, the 
data available on these other ingredients are mixed with data on other products, not 
accurately classified or, in the case of corn gluten, the percentages in the formula-
tions are relatively smaller. In addition, some of the ingredients or wheat by-products 
used in formulations are produced in Puerto Rico, and the data are not available.23
For contrasting services, other factors were presented and described to the par-
ticipants to particularize the differences between domestic and foreign maritime 
services. These factors were punctuality, intercommunication, product management, 
and cultural issues (Table 3). 
3.5. Fruit and vegetables importers
The majority of the fresh-produce importers in Puerto Rico are native-family agri-
businesses. Although few in number, they supply almost 75 percent of the imported 
produce to feed the total market. The remaining 25 percent is from transnational 
companies that focus on processed products rather than fresh goods.
For fruits, the cycle begins on the (US) west coast, then moves to the south coast until 
winter when Peru and eventually Chile become the suppliers until late spring, when they 
return to California.
Puerto Rico’s data on the value of imports, particularly for agriculture and food 
produce from the US, show a pattern of increase in foods and some reduction in the 
agriculture group. However, Puerto Rico’s dependency on other markets to sustain 
its more basic needs for food is certainly more dramatic when the transportation 
service is totally privatized, and the market is relatively limited in its ability to adopt 
counterbalance measures. In addition, the purchasing strategies, in this importing 
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QUALITY
Firm Packaging Product Handling
10 HQ HQ HQ
9 HQ Good Good
11 Medium Good Medium
13 Medium Low Good
1 N/A Medium -
2 N/A HQ Good
3 N/A HQ Good
5 N/A Medium -
8 N/A - Good
Table 3: Puerto Rico’s agribusiness importers’ perception of Latin American exports 
P
R
O
D
U
C
E
G
R
A
IN
INSECURITY
Firm
On Trade
(Distrust)
Technical SPS Regulations
Political Stabil-
ity
10 Low Medium High Low
9 Low Medium VH Low
11 Low Medium High Low
13 Medium VH VH Low
1 VH - VH -
2 Low Medium VH Low
3 VH VH VH Medium
5 VH VH VH VH
8 VH High Low VH
P
R
O
D
U
C
E
G
R
A
IN
INTERCOMMUNICATION
Firm Language Issues Phone/Fax Online
10 Low Low VH
9 Low High Medium
11 Low Medium High
13 Low Medium Medium
1 High High Low
2 VH VH Medium
3 VH High High
5 High VH -
8 High High High
P
R
O
D
U
C
E
G
R
A
IN
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sector of Puerto Rico, follow the US season of production, which means that when 
the US market lacks some produce, its importers look abroad.24 As a result, except 
for some roots or tanniers (so far not produced in the US), the fresh-produce import-
ers have their itinerary of purchasing starting and ending with US production. For 
instance, for green leaves, their main suppliers are the West Coast of the US, then in 
mid-autumn Mexico, then in the spring the southeast coast of Canada, and then Cali-
fornia until the next cycle. For fruits, the cycle begins on the (US) west coast, then 
moves to the south coast until winter when Peru and eventually Chile become the 
suppliers until late spring, when they return to California. These systematic forms of 
trading follow the US market because, from the perspective of volume, they can buy 
at lower prices in comparison with Puerto Rico. As a result, the US purchasers and 
consolidation firms, in partnership with Puerto Rico’s importers, may supply foreign 
products in accordance with the restrictions of applicable SPS measures at relatively 
competitive prices for their standards. Inevitably, the domestic (US) maritime ser-
vice providers have to be contracted to carry these supplies to Puerto Rico.
Due to the fact that perfect substitution is not always possible in this business, the 
Cabotage Act is a given constraint on this market. We have to deal with it, hence 
reducing the time and many of our efficiencies.
Liberalization could bring some changes to competition and the cost of trade might be 
lower. It is likely that the cost of importing raw materials would be lower, as well as the 
rates for transporting manufactured food. The latter scenario may need more analy-
sis, particularly from the perspective of the current limited national food production. 
Currently, native food manufacturing in Puerto Rico is practically non-existent, and 
around 65 percent of products are imported from the US. The remaining percentage 
is imported from countries to which the US Cabotage Act does not apply. Therefore, a 
reduction in the cost of domestic transportation should also reduce the cost of domes-
tic imports made under a similar sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) framework to PR. 
The negative effects of this would be on the local producers. They would have to 
reduce their prices to compete with the domestic imports in unfair conditions and lack 
of volume. In that sense, a relaxation in the Cabotage Act on the manufactured goods 
would be beneficial for the importers and supermarkets, but it might be a hard punch 
for the native agriculture rather than a benefit. However, if it is about price competition, 
currently the native producers are highly affected by the produce from the Dominican 
Republic that has a similar productive season and lower cost to produce than PR.
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Puerto Rico’s importers are not restricted to importing products only from the US mar-
ket; thus, the market could be considered as an open market. However, for importing 
food and agricultural products, other NTMs have to be taken into account. Conse-
quently, the application of all the US regulations to food, labeling, canning, and so forth 
on Puerto Rico’s market reduces the number of places to trade. Furthermore, whilst for 
the domestic imports the inspection protocols at the port are practically non-existent, 
at the foreign imports they are complex. The delay in trucking a container will depend 
on the ship’s arrival time and the number of containers queuing. It is not unusual for 
foreign arrivals between 15:00 and 17:00 to schedule an inspection time 24 hours later. 
For instance, once the containers have been discharged from the ship and the process 
of container recognition begins, consisting of inspection, fumigation and other red-
tape procedures, they are normally completed in 12 to 72 labor hours.25
In my professional experience dealing with the elements of quality, produce management 
and packaging, I have not noticed big differences between foreign and domestic 
produce. However, the SPS inspections and port complexities on imports from abroad are 
the major obstacle to looking more to Central and South American suppliers.
To contrast the maritime services, the participants were invited to identify the 
differences between domestic and foreign companies. These factors were coded in 
three groups: quality,26 insecurity, and intercommunication (Table 4). Regarding de-
lays or inaccuracies in the delivery schedules or ETA, the participants affirmed that 
it would depend on the maritime firms. Some lines are much more punctual than 
others, but interviewees categorized the foreign maritime firms as the group with the 
most frequent occurrence of unpunctuality. Since Horizon’s closure, the domestic 
transport is showing more problems due to the lack of space. 
Concerning the intercommunication issues, which are those associated with 
identifying problems in shipping or tracking containers, all participants said domes-
tic firms are more diligent or at least it is easier to obtain information from their web-
site or by email. Apparently, domestic firms are perceived more “client oriented”27 
about informing issues on board that may cause delays or other problems that would 
be managed in advance, if the importer was informed. One of the participants said 
that a reason to hire a third party contractor was precisely to reduce logistical uncer-
tainties due to the lack of communication of the foreign maritime firm contracted by 
its produce supplier in Latin America. 
One dimension that is not directly associated with the Cabotage Act but may in-
fluence the cost of trade is the years of business partnerships between importers and 
suppliers. Purchasing teams are focused on the same companies that traditionally 
were trading with without seeking competitors. This is not a negative point when 
it is part of a dynamic market analysis but it might be when purchasing decisions 
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are taken without an ample analysis of providers. The interviewed firms are based 
on ‘high reliability’ of their suppliers; thus, searching for new providers is under-
taken sporadically. Although the rates for transporting inland are higher than the sea 
freight rates,28 a business partnership extending over years has a higher probability 
of trade than searching for options abroad and in better conditions.
You are making me reflect hard about it. I have to admit that with some frequency we 
begin the searching process to eventually supply a client, but at the end of the day my 
purchasing team selects the same provider that traditionally supplies us. We are always 
doing the same. Although it is ‘better the devil you know’, we are in a comfort zone. 
Lack of doing different things and trying to search for options at least to identify other 
possible providers.
All of the participant firms in this category expressed their disagreement with the 
application of the US Cabotage Act to PR’s market. Their most common argument was 
based on the over-cost added to imports. A few of them argued the lack of competition 
of maritime transporters in PR is the most problematic issue, but a bigger problem is 
the lack of vessels properly prepared for reefers. According to them, both scenarios are 
having serious effects on their businesses, increasing the cost for the consumers. 
The maritime market needs more service providers because currently the fresh-produce 
importers are choosing between a single, faster, limited-space company (Sea Star) and 
a firm with space in a slow vessel (Crowley). Both scenarios limit our businesses. I am of 
the belief that having more ways for transporting imports or having faster ships to trade, 
the local businesses would be much better and our consumers too.
Here is an example of how cabotage may restrict the supply chain logistics on 
this economic sector. One of the most frequent suppliers of potatoes in Puerto Rico 
has its origins in the port of Halifax in Canada, which also carries other supplies to 
some of the British Caribbean Islands. Consequently, to optimize the shipping and 
reduce inefficiencies and time, one possible option could be to stop in New York to 
collect some products for Puerto Rico. However, this is not allowed by the US Cabo-
tage; as a result, the importer should schedule a US-flagged vessel to obtain these 
products or transport them by inland trucking to the Jacksonville Port, which has 
more frequent trips to San Juan.  
The cabotage limitation for the use of foreign vessels affects my logistic optimization and 
as a result the price to do business and my produce on the shelf.
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3.6. Other emerging topics
A basic flow chart about the Cabotage’s layers was developed (Fig. 4) to show layer 
of elements affected (directly or indirectly) by the Act during the agrifood importing 
activities. Certainly, many other elements might be considered. 
The following example of costs was used by one participant. He said a 40 per-
cent reduction in the current cost of domestic transportation would reduce the basic 
cost of farming.  
A 100 pound (45.4 kg) bag of fertilizer in the US is around $3.50, but in PR due to the 
freight cost it is between $0.10 and $0.14 per 50 pounds (22.7 kg) over the original cost. 
As a result, the importer is paying around $0.22 extra just for bringing the produce from 
the US. It means that the basic price of 100 pounds (45.4 kg) of this fertilizer will start at 
$3.72. However, the importer should add its expenses and profit, almost 9% of the cost 
($0.37); therefore, the consumer will be paying easily $4.10. Certainly, this is not a big 
deal for a casual consumer, but the $0.60 means money for a regular farmer.29
Many additional variables over the price of the commodity affect produces cost, 
such as the cost of its management, refrigerated containers, transportation (inland 
and ocean), logistics and regulatory frameworks. Additionally, the elements of rel-
atively low volume, little competition in the market (lack of production), and low 
availability of domestic maritime transporters cause the price of the affected goods, 
such as fruits and vegetables, to rise disproportionately. 
It is like a tax to preserve inefficiency but in a category of products that, according to the 
international health organizations, should be more consumed by the people. 
Another dimension was presented by the expectancy of new higher capacity 
ships that will be incorporated into Puerto Rico’s market in a year. Undeniably, new 
and efficient vessels to transport reefers are highly necessary. The pace of the in-
ternational maritime providers in the last decade was moving in a similar direction 
to become more efficient (Burns 2015). However, sustainability patterns in Puerto 
Rico’s businesses are not well known; thus, business decision-making tends to con-
sider limited scenarios of almost five years without much analysis of the underlying 
elements. Therefore, if Puerto Rico’s economic situation is taken into account—a 
reduction in population and exportation; the cost of energy; and the reduction in 
the annual family expenses at the supermarket level30—how will the (four) new 
ships exclusively for Puerto Rico’s route be cost-effective for the current domes-
tic31 maritime providers?
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4.0 Conclusion 
Puerto Rico’s development is immersed in a historical structure of dependency in 
which government intervention, production inefficiencies, and a large economy (the 
US but previously Spain) had control over Puerto Rico’s growth. To guarantee this, 
customs control, cabotage, and other regulatory frameworks in favor of the US cor-
porations were established. The “US Jewel of the Caribbean” seems to be an inef-
ficient, uncompetitive, and expensive place to produce, highly controlled by US mul-
tinationals and experiencing a high level of brain drain (out-migrants to the US). Its 
soon-to-be-decade-old depressed economy and approximately 12 percent sustained 
unemployment in a restricted trade framework, limits the possibilities for participat-
ing actively in the global economy and trading with more flexible markets. Some les-
sons from Puerto Rico’s experience could be meaningful to other territories, and this 
research offers a different approach through mixed method to evaluate the effect of a 
NTM to trade on SIDS agrifood supply chain. 
1. A restriction on the main transportation on a SIDS market (without any inland 
connection among suppliers) affects the importers’ capacity.
2. Cabotage requirements and its cross regulations have direct and indirect effects 
early on Puerto Rico’s agribusiness supply chain activities. 
3. The US Maritime Merchant Act limits the range of suppliers affecting the supply 
chain of PR’s agribusinesses based on imports from the US. 
4. Puerto Rico’s agribusiness importers, despite having options to import from 
abroad, are limited because they have to comply with other factors affecting 
their decisional process to purchase. For instance, the US sanitary and phyto-
sanitary restrictions, the US weight limits on containers, the lack of volume in 
their market, lack of cash flow, obsolete infrastructure on their terminals, and 
the lack of consolidation services from abroad.
5. The data on the costs associated with freight are under the control of the mar-
itime transportation firms, thus private. Its rates or patterns are neither pub-
lished nor centralized or collected by the Government of Puerto Rico. This 
lack of access to data only allows the shippers to allocate specific routes among 
themselves at predetermined rates. Those with higher volumes get the better 
rates and priority.
6. The vulnerability of Puerto Rico’s market was highlighted by the closure of 
Horizon in December 2015. After hurricane Maria (September 2017), maritime 
domestic firms in Puerto Rico did not have enough (cost-benefit) capacity to 
deal with extraordinary situations to ensure a continuous flow of cargo to Puerto 
Rico. In addition, the lack of sustainable operations on the ports of Mayagüez 
and Ponce, constraint even more the supply chain. Currently, a few fleet ships 
are suitable for fresh food containers and/or reefers, but some importers said 
although the scenario is improving. Hundreds of containers are still left-behind 
in Florida due to lack of space on cargo vessels. Maria’s emergency demonstrat-
ed maritime firms’ limitations of space. However, during the period of this re-
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search, it was anticipated because the number of ships available for reefers was 
only one. 
7. Areas of opportunity at the internal level regarding supply chain competitive-
ness of the sectors under exploration were identified. 
Bearing in mind this research was founded on most of the sustainable develop-
ment goals, the analysis of cabotage shows multidimensional effects on food avail-
ability and accessibility trigger vulnerability. The cost of energy in Puerto Rico, influ-
enced by its obsolete and highly dependent fossil fuel system, is also affected by the 
US Cabotage when equipment and some fuel are transported from there.. In addition, 
port maintenance activities (e.g., dredging, electric submarine cable), exploratory ac-
tivities as seen and renewable projects such as ocean wind farms are affected by the 
Act. The energy cost and the extra cost of transportation (on fuel, containers, grains, 
etc.) are considered by the participants as the most important factor with effects on 
Puerto Rico’s agrifood supply chain. Unfortunately, sea transportation restrictions 
and their complex structures and layers of service costs developed through the years 
make it difficult to estimate the real cost of NTM on the agribusiness sector. How-
ever, the most frequent journeys to Puerto Rico are made by domestic vessels. The 
importers expressed their preferences for the US market and in the case of animal 
feedstuff, Puerto Rico’s farmers are absorbing that overcost. 
The sum of all these factors—internal and external—affect Puerto Rico’s agri-
food sector. Liberalizing cabotage without any investments or internal changes could 
reduce the price of many goods related to farming in the short term, but in the long 
term would have a negative effect on Puerto Rico’s native agribusiness importers. 
Probably, they will be affected by the foreign price structure of goods with potential 
effects reducing the number of native agribusinesses and eroding Puerto Rico’s food 
sovereignty potential. On the other hand, preserving the law as it is would maintain 
the same business structures and its vulnerabilities without a sustainable solution 
for Puerto Rico and its competitiveness. Strategic investments in commercial ports’ 
lanes and terminals’ infrastructure, automating and digitizing processes, promoting 
rivalry among maritime firms, strengthening the local industry firms’ supporters, and 
manufacturers’ product diversification would be the key to a healthier competitive-
ness environment. Other dimensions such as fiscal (inventory taxes), geographical 
(incentives for densification of two of the main port-cities), firms (operational inef-
ficiencies), and anthropological issues related to the local producers’ behavior are 
indirect dimensions that might bring vulnerabilities to PR’s food supply chain. 
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NOTES
1 For this purpose, agrifood is considered as a business of producing food linked to agriculture 
production, which in a system is developed according to the local resources, cultural, and 
social productive characteristics. The food supply chain, on the other hand, considers the 
variables on an effective system between “farms and forks.” It includes production, infrastruc-
ture, delivery, technological changes, environmental issues, sustainable management, and 
governance structures.
2 During that period the US Congress approved, at least, three different laws named Jones Act. 
The Jones-Shafroth Act that regulates PR’s citizenship; the one about Land Grant Colleges 
(UPR-RUM) Bankhead-Jones Act, 1935; and the one related to Cabotage, which is the one 
written by Wesley Jones, as the Maritime Merchant Act of 1920 (46 USC Title, Chapter 24; 
many sections on related topics).
3 Since 1789, the U.S. Law requires US workers, crew, and flagged ships for domestic maritime 
transportation. A few maritime laws were approved between 1810 and 1887. Eventually, due 
to its lack of competitiveness for shore-side support functions and many US shipping firms 
disappears into consolidations. US shipping faced significant cost disadvantages from the turn 
of the 20th century (Sagers 2006).
4 American Samoa, Mariana Island, and the Virgin Islands.
5 Cabotage welfare costs on PR’s economy, although without agreement from the academic 
community, have been estimated between $0 million and $400 million per year.
6 Overall around 11,000 farmers and native agribusiness for the time of the fieldwork
7 VRIO (Valuable; Rare; costly to Initiate; Organized to capture value). These four segments 
are conformed by variables (infrastructure, location, reputation, economic performance, envi-
ronment threat, social complexity, operational, innovation, and capabilities) to evaluate firms’ 
competitive advantage cycle.
8 Visibility in the supply chain refers to risk reduction, proactively tracking products, identify-
ing potential disruptions.
9 Gorton and associates (2013) outlined a framework to evaluate the relationship of elements 
and determinants of competitiveness in agriculture supply chain.
10 Due to the limitations of well-defined theoretical frameworks for the analysis of NTMs, this 
exploratory research follows a pragmatic stance.
11 In a basic formulation for animal feed mill, the most common macro-ingredients are maize, 
soy, wheat, and fishmeal. The quantitative analysis was analyzed using a gravity model (formula).
12 San Juan, Guayanilla, Humacao, Jobos, Ponce, Mayagüez, Fajardo, Guánica, Aguadilla, 
Arecibo and Yabucoa (USCoC 2015). So far, the last two are limited to oil imports. Ponce & 
Mayaguez are delegated port thus not administered by PRPA.
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13 Puerto Rico’s archipelago includes the ports of Vieques and Culebra.
14 Some atmospheric phenomenona such as hurricanes may provoke high movements of sedi-
ments reducing port depths.
15 Between 2011 and 2013 some organizations, the 2012 political campaign, and eventually a 
few Puerto Rican Congressmen, the Governor of Puerto Rico, and the US Resident Commis-
sioner of Puero Rico, publicly converged on the needs of a solution in benefit of Puerto Rico’s 
competitiveness. By the Recovery Act of 2009 many projects of infrastructure in the US were 
developed. Eventually, the sea-port activities were included.  
16 Private firms dedicated to any activity related to the shipping process of importing and exporting, 
such as terminal operators, maritime lines, docking or vessel repairs or mechanics, stevedoring, port 
logistics distribution, docking support, and so on. Anaya-Oviedo (2012) explores this in more detail.
17 Percentages were mentioned during the interviews. No quantitative data to sustain it were 
provided or analyzed. However, similar approximations are presented by Szakonyi (2014) and 
Comas (2009).
18 See e.g. Szakonyi (2014) for a succinct analysis.
19 The effects of containers reduction towers northbound could be associated with the dein-
dustrialization process described by Caraballo-Cueto and Lara (2018).  
20 Anaya-Oviedo (2012) reports that 36 percent of the custom-brokers in Puerto Rico consider 
the use of the technology in this process to be below the regular level (4/7); 80 percent of the 
maritime service providers consider that inland access to terminals and port facilities in San 
Juan is poorly maintained and/or underdeveloped, and 40 percent of them believe that sea 
roads of the San Juan Port are underdeveloped. Similarly, 50 percent of them have the same 
opinion about the lack of cranes and equipment in terminals.
21 Demurrage fees could vary among firms but in some cases could be such as $2,000 per hour 
and other $10,000 per day or fraction. 
22 Available data on Puerto Rico’s external trade as an animal feed data segment show lower 
values because they consider as cereals some particular grains that are frequently used in 
animal feed mills; hence, they are not classified in their section.
23 This is the case of wheat mesh and the premixed micronutrients’ formulation. The formula 
used is basically 70 percent of maize. Unit is a cow in production for dairy farm. In Poultry 
Farms, the analysis considered four flocks per year but five in 2014. In hog farms, the produc-
tion cycle (C) is between 125 to 200 days under ordinary conditions.
24 Particularly to the Latin American markets but it is fundamentally lead by seasonality.
25 The working hours of the port inspectors of the USDA and the PRDA differ by season and 
are fewer than those of the private service providers.
26 The code related to Quality included: punctuality, packaging, product, and handling. The 
code of Insecurity included distrust on issues related to sanitary and phytosanitary policies 
to trade, political stability, and technical or management issues at port level or with carriers. 
The code of intercommunication focused on cultural issues (such as language, meanings, and 
metric systems), and most frequent methods of communication.
27 Participants perceived that the domestic maritime firms are more informative and diligent 
than the foreign one.
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28 An anecdotal example was the case of purchasing green leaves from California and trans-
porting them to Jacksonville. The inland rate is over $6,000, and the sea rate from Jacksonville 
to San Juan is around $4,000. Consequently, a container of 900 cartons of lettuce is almost $10 
per box over the produce price as a result of the cost of transport.
29 Although fertilization is a relatively common routine practice and its volume depends on 
soil conditions and crop requirements, in tropical soils the use of 2,800 kg per acre is consid-
ered to be a very basic measure. Using that on the example, the extra cost of transport only will 
represent $616 (USD) per acre over the cost of the product.
30 MIDA (2014) estimates a reduction of 14 percent less than in 2013.
31 The price of Crowley and Sea Star new LNG ships (two each) for Puerto Rico was estimated 
to be over $150 million per ship.
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